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In some of his recent articles —in particular 
those appearing in numbers 6 and 10 of this 
Review— the author's object has been to de-
scribe the principal components and relation-
ships characterizing the structure of peripheral 
capitalism, to bring to light the fundamental 
conflicts which it generates as it evolves, and to 
sketch out guidelines for its transformation. 
From the socio-economic standpoint, the 
essence of the system lies in the form taken by 
capital accumulation and income distribution 
and their interrelationships, which produce 
various negative effects, in particular insuffi-
cient dynamism and distributive inequity. The 
environment problems which have gained re-
latively recent notoriety, such as the depletion 
of natural resources, the pollution of water and 
the atmosphere, and urban congestion, stem 
from the very dynamism of the system, both in 
the centres and in the periphery, and from its 
1. Problems of the biosphere in capitalism 
^In others words, the main effects of the change in 
OPEC ' s price policy derive from its suddenness rather that 
from its magnitude. If the price of oil had risen to its present 
level by an annual increase of 3% of its relative price over 
the past 25 years, the adjustments needed to absorb such an 
increase would have had little influence on world growth, 
and it would even have been to some extent beneficial, 
inasmuch as it would have oriented behaviour and techno-
logical experiment towards more efficient utilization of 
energy. Instead, the progressive lowering of petroleum 
prices over a period of 20 years made for wasteful use of oil 
—especially in the United States— and deferred the search 
s c a n t c a p a c i t y to fo resee t h e m a n d dea l w i th 
them in time. They have likewise helped to 
aggravate existing problems and to create other 
new ones, considerably complicating the out-
look for the next few decades. 
At all events, they have taught the periph-
ery an important lesson, inasmuch as they have 
helped to dispel the illusion that it could de-
velop in the image and likeness of the centres; 
once again, hard facts will compel it to search 
independently for a path of its own. 
*Director of the CEPAL Review. 
It is now possible to obtain a clearer insight 
than before into capitalist development in the 
centres. T h e exceptional impetus gained over 
the last few decades, until recent times, is the 
consequence not only of impressive technical 
progress but also of irrational exploitation of 
natural resources —above all, of energy— 
which, in its turn, has had a marked influence 
on the orientation of technique. So there has 
been an element of falsity in the operation of 
the system which has had highly dramatic world 
implications. 
In all this a decisively important role has 
been played in the periphery of the world eco-
nomy by the hegemonic power of the centres, 
especially that of the United States, the main 
dynamic centre of capitalism. The petroleum-
exporting countries had no power to act in op-
position to the hegemony in question, although 
they had long been clearly aware that this prod-
uct of their sub-soil was being wantonly squan-
dered; bu t they would have come up against 
vigorous resistance to any attempt to contain its 
inordinate exploitation, despite their concern 
at the depletion of so valuable a resource., 
The fact has been in evidence for several 
decades. But the exporter countries could not 
adopt measures to reduce the rate of consump-
tion; the opposition they encountered would 
have been invincible, given the power of the 
great centres and their transnational corpora-
tions. Hollis Chenery, distinguished econo-
mist and President of the World Bank, main-
tained in an article published shortly after the 
initial rise in petroleum prices that if prices had 
been put up gradually, in view of the evidence 
that this resource was not limitless, the world 
economy would have adapted itself without 
much ado to so indispensable an adjustment.J 
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But that is not how the system works; and only 
in an international conjuncture which allowed 
them to acquire enough power to face up to the 
power of the centres have the exporter coun-
tries been able to take concerted measures to 
restrict the growth of production. 
The irrationality with which petroleum 
has been exploited has indeed spread throug-
out the system. The low cost of oil has had 
considerable influence on technological re-
search, steering it towards extremely abusive 
ways of using this non-renewable good as well 
as oher natural resources; and all this has been 
fostered by the unequal distribution of the 
fruits of the increasing productivity of tech-
nique —an inequity attributable to the nature 
of the social structure and of the changes 
therein. 
Nor is this all. Until recent times techno-
logical research had not concerned itself with 
the adverse effects of technique on the environ-
ment. 
Thus, the repercussions of development 
on the biosphere are very serious: the deple-
tion of non-renewable natural resources, in par-
ticular petroleum, and the pollution of the at-
mosphere, rivers and seas, as well as the dete-
rioration of natural resources which, although 
renewable, are not exempt from the harmful 
effects of technique. These are notorious facts, 
to which must be added what may prove to be 
the pernicious effects on climate of the increas-
ing emanation of carbon dioxide into the at-
mosphere. 
Such is the ambivalence of technique: on 
the one hand its enormous contribution to hu-
man welfare, thanks to the steady upward trend 
of productivity, and, on the other hand, its dam-
aging repercussions on the biosphere. 
Philosophers and humanists have long 
for alternative sources of energy. Now we are faced with the 
need for rapid changes in consumption patterns and heavy 
investment in developing sources of energy independently 
of OPEC, in addition to the necessity of financing the cost 
of indispensable imports. See Hollis B. Chenery, "Restruc-
turing the World Economy", World Development, vol. 2, 
Nos. 10-12, October-December 1974, pp. 1-9. 
been turning their attention to the psychosocial 
implications of technique; but economists, in 
contrast, have generally been unwilling to take 
account of its ambivalence in the interpretation 
of development phenomena. They have re-
garded it as an exogenous factor, like the politi-
cal, social and cultural aspects of reality. Ob-
sessed by a peculiar doctrinal asepsis, they 
have withstood the insertion of these elements 
and of their interrelationships into the dynam-
ics of development. 
To define the place of technique and its 
implications in the development process will 
be our aim in the following pages. To start with, 
the major contradictions of its ambivalence 
elude the so-called regulatory operation of 
market laws; deliberate action is required to 
countervail them. In face of them, would it be 
possible to go on asserting that the unrestricted 
play of market forces leads to the correct and 
efficient allocation of productive resources? I 
do not, of course, deny the importance of the 
market. But behind it there are structures that 
distort its workings. 
The deliberate action aforesaid inevitably 
entails the introduction of major adjustments 
in the operation of the system. But important as 
these are in themselves, the need for them is 
supplementary to the necessity of correcting 
the significant distortions that had been oc-
curring before the problems of the biosphere 
were brought to the fore. Both these earlier dis-
tortions and the contradictions of technique 
represent deep-seated perversions of the oper-
ation of the system. They go far beyond the 
aggravating effects of energy prices on an in-
flationary spiral which had already been 
growing to impressive proportions. 
To tackle the energy crisis and the other 
problems of the biosphere will certainly be 
impossible without a reorientation of techno-
logical research, and will at the same time call 
for a considerable capital accumulation effort 
which can only be made at the expense of con-
sumption or of any increase in it: a supremely 
important political problem. We will begin 
with the first of these requirements, and then 
go on to deal with the adjustment of con-
sumption. 
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2. Irrationality in the exploitation of energy, 
and technological research 
As already pointed out, the irrational extraction 
of petroleum, and its abusive use thanks to its 
low cost, have sidetracked technological re-
search into channels that have led, in the first 
place, to greater irrationality throughout the 
ent i re system, and, secondly, to the deteriora-
tion of the environmet. The following are the 
most important cases in point. 
Research has been diverted from other 
sources of energy which were known, but the 
deve lopment of which was of no economic in-
terest because of the low price oí petroleum. I 
refer in particular to distillation from coal and 
to the production of gas or liquid fuels from 
agricultural or forest resources. Solar energy 
too has been neglected. Today the relevant re-
search is being promoted, with due regard to 
the necessity of conserving the environment. 
This last point is also a matter of great techno-
logical concern in the field of nuclear energy. 
Research for energy-saving purposes has 
been insufficient. It has gained importance in 
consequence of the petroleum crisis, with very 
posit ive results both for industrial production 
and for motorized transport. For example, Ford 
has produced a new engine (the Proco) which 
reduces at one and the same time consumption 
of petrol and pollution of the environment. 
Why was this innovation not introduced be-
fore? Technological research in this connexion 
had previously been devoted mainly to pro-
ducing heavy vehicles characterized by inten-
sive energy consumption to step up their horse-
power, while at the same time speed limits 
were imposed on the major highways. 
Thanks to the cheapness of energy, techno-
logical research has succeeded in substituting 
synthetic and plastic materials for natural fibres 
and wood: all this to the detriment of employ-
ment of labour, especially in developing coun-
tries. No attempt has been made to direct re-
search towards improving the qualities of the 
natural products. 
In agriculture, according to Dr. Sauma, Di-
rector-General of FAO, the low cost of petro-
leum brought about the second technological 
revolution.2 It was the revolution consisting in 
mechanization and the use of fertilizers and 
pesticides of petrochemical origin. The first, 
which had taken place a long time before, had 
been a revolution introducing new biological 
procedures, subsequent development of which 
lost the great impetus it might have gained had 
cheap petroleum not been available. And now, 
in Dr. Sauma's view, we are witnessing a third 
revolution which is precisely of a biological 
character, or whose lessons can be combined 
with those of the second revolution. 
There would seem to be substantial pos-
sibilities of increasing yields by the adoption of 
biological practices: such as, for example, the 
use of bacteria for nitrogen fixation in plants. 
Moreover, this technique and others will make 
it possible to employ more labour on the land 
while improving yields per hectare and per 
worker. Microbes must be set to work, in this 
and other possible biological procedures! And 
so must insects!3 
The great advantages of mechanization are 
undeniable . But in the periphery it has been 
carried too far, to the disadvantage of employ-
ment, and has not increased yields per hectare 
but only per worker. It has been carried too far 
not only because of low petroleum prices but 
also because the private interest of farmers 
—especially that of large-scale agricultural 
entrepreneurs— incites them to mechanization 
without the system's being able to absorb all 
the manpower thus turned off: a substantial 
proportion is left redundant in the countryside 
or shifts its redundancy to the towns. In so far as 
this happens, labour and capital are veritably 
thrown away. 
Again in respect of agriculture, techno-
logical research has shown much less interest 
in questions concerning land in the tropics than 
in those relating to land in the temperate zones 
where technical progress has been concen-
2See his recent speech at the symposium on re-
sources, environment, population and development, orga-
nized by the United Nations and the Government of 
Sweden and held at Stockholm, from 6 to 14 August, 1979. 
3 The New York Times ot 18 August of the current year 
reports that in China experiments are being conducted in 
the breeding of certain spiders which perform the same 
role as petrochemical insecticides without adverse eco-
logical effects. 
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trated. It is said that in Latin America 90% of 
the possibilities of expanding the agricultural 
area are to be found in the tropics; yet very little 
research has been conducted on soil use, the 
most suitable crops and other products and 
their conservation in tropical conditions. In 
reality, except in the case of a few products of 
importance in world trade, this is an agriculture 
of the poor. And despite the increasing number 
of poor people in the world, their demand is not 
sufficient to encourage technical progress 
within the play of market laws. 
But however great an impetus were given 
to technological research, it would not suffice 
to combat this grave human problem. It is a 
good thing that the agriculture of the poor has 
begun to be an object of concern in internation-
al circles, but the problem cannot be resolved 
out of the context of development; it cannot be 
resolved without speeding up the growth rate 
of the product and altering the composition of 
the social product as well. 
Lastly, the considerable rise in productivi-
ty, largely based on the low price of petroleum, 
has greatly influenced technological research 
directed towards the steadily increasing diver-
sification of goods and services, generally with 
an accompanying waste of energy and of other 
resources. A growing proportion of capital ac-
cumulation has served the purposes of this di-
versification; such capital does not step up 
productivity but improves the efficiency of 
goods and their capacity to satisfy considera-
tions of emulation and social status. This is 
consumptive, not reproductive capital. Its ac-
cumulation beyond certain limits —whether in 
the sphere of private activity or in that of the 
State— has adverse effects on reproductive ca-
pital accumulation, to the detriment of the 
growth of productivity. 
This process cannot be properly under-
stood unless the great disparities in income 
distribution are taken into account. A brief ex-
planation of it will be opportune here. 
3. Incessant diversification of goods 
and services 
During the early phases of the historical devel-
opment of capitalism, the power of the upper 
strata of the social structure, in whose hands a 
major proportion of the means of production 
was concentrated, enabled them to appropriate 
the lion's share of the fruits of technical prog-
ress. In later stages of capitalist development, 
however, the labour force gradually acquired 
increasing redistributive capacity; and in the 
course of structural change it strengthened its 
power to share with the upper strata the bene-
fits of improved productivity, both sponta-
neously through the play of market forces and, 
when these did not allow it to do so, by virtue of 
its growing trade-union organization and polit-
ical influence. Trade-union power to push up 
its wages, political power to obtain employ-
ment opportunities and social services from the 
State. 
However, the rising trend of productivity 
enabled the upper strata to keep their share in 
income high, despite the aforesaid increase in 
the redistributive power of the labour force. 
The steady growth of income and this ine-
quality in its distribution did much to direct 
technological research, as noted above, to-
wards the incessant diversification of goods 
and services on the basis of intensive use of 
energy and other non-renewable resources. 
Thanks to this diversification (under the aegis 
of entrepreneurial oligopolies) it became pos-
sible to stimulate the demand and tap the in-
come of the disadvantaged strata. 
As the benefits of technical progress fil-
tered downwards, new social strata were 
enabled to participate progressively in this 
diversification process, although in widely 
varying degrees, while new consumption pat-
terns continued to whet the demand of the 
uppper strata. And in this process, alongside 
the spread of the positive effects of develop-
ment, its adverse repercussions on the bios-
phere have been intensified. 
Such is the dynamics of the consumer so-
ciety in the main centre of capitalism, whence 
it is propagated to the other centres —which 
contribute to this phenomenon— and to a peri-
phery which increasingly strives to imitate 
these consumption patterns to the detriment of 
the social equity of development, as will be 
seen later. In the peripheral countries inequity 
is aggravated by the effects of the population 
explosion: yet another manifestation of the 
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ambivalence of the technique which protects 
and prolongs human life in a social structure 
very different from that of its countries of 
origin. 
In its turn, the prodigious development of 
the mass communication media has played a 
powerful part in exalting the consumer society. 
Here too we witness the ambivalence of tech-
nique; no one can deny that the mass media 
techniques have made a striking contribution to 
human welfare, but their pernicious effects be-
come increasingly evident in their continual 
manipulation of the so-called "sovereignty of 
the consumer". 
All these are highly significant cultural 
changes which the progress of technique 
brings in its train. The problems involved are 
not only those of the deterioration of the bios-
phere, but also those of human values, of the 
ousting of essential values by the over-ruling 
value of consumption. Powerful agents of mar-
ket expansion, the mass media techniques are 
throwing away their enormous potential for ob-
jective information, for clarification of the new 
phenomena of collective life and, above all, for 
cultural enrichment. 
There is another highly significant aspect 
of the social inequity of capitalism which can-
not be passed over here. I wonder whether the 
sensational urban congestion and the appalling 
pollution of the environment would ever have 
come about if the fruits of technical progress 
had been disseminated throughout the whole 
community by way of rising income or falling 
prices, as the neoclassical economists had 
imagined. The demands of technique unques-
tionably entail some measure of urban concen-
tration, which is likewise promoted by histo-
rical and political factors; but it is given greater 
impetus by the initial income distribution pat-
tern which characterizes capitalist devel-
opment. De facto, the income increment is 
appropriated, in one way or another, by the 
upper strata, and triggers off an expansion of 
demand and diversified production of goods 
and services, with the consequent increase in 
employment. An increase which is largely 
achieved by bringing labour from the country-
side, since demand for agricultural commodi-
ties, as is common knowledge, develops much 
less intensively than demand for town-pro-
duced industrial goods. Thus there has been a 
trend towards centralization of demand and 
employment which would not have been so 
sharp had the fruits of technical prpgress been 
disseminated in a different way. 
These centres of demand and employment 
are the cities of smog and pollution, of frenzied 
traffic jams; the dehumanized cities whence 
little neighbourly communities disappear, 
wiped out by the functional specialization of 
urban activity. Not unconnected with all this is 
the motorcar, in which again the ambivalence 
of technique is strikingly revealed. 
4. Changes in the composition of capital 
and the growth rate of productivity 
As was previously remarked, in the growth of 
productivity there has been a veritable falsifi-
cation due to the depletion of the sources of 
energy and the deterioration of the environ-
ment. The progressive correction of this ele-
ment of falsity calls for considerable capital 
accumulation, in order both to save energy and 
exploit new sources, and to prevent pollution. 
This capital accumulation, although, of 
great social utility, will not be reflected in those 
constant increases in economic productivity 
which have characterized the development of 
capitalism, especially in its dynamic centre. 
Thus, the composition of capital will be grad-
ually altered, inasmuch as the proportion of 
capital allocated to the protection of the bio-
sphere, so to speak, will increase, and the pro-
portion of capital earmarked for stepping up 
economic productivity will decline. This 
change in the composition of capital must nec-
essarily slow down the growth rate of the sys-
tem's average productivity, and therefore of the 
global product. 
Obviously, if there were to be an increase 
in the proportion of the global product used for 
accumulation purposes —and not merely a 
change in the composition of capital, as in-
dicated above— the growth of consumption 
would have to be more tightly constricted. This 
would be an inevitable necessity over a transi-
tional period, during which the growth rate of 
consumption would be lower than that of ac-
cumulation. After this period, however, the two 
rates could be the same: but it must be borne in 
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mind that, in any event, the degree of effec-
tiveness of energy-saving measures will strong-
ly influence the growth of the product, 
It is precisely during this transitional pe-
riod that the major adjustments demanded by 
the petroleum crisis and the conservation of the 
environment will have to be introduced. It will 
be a t ime of all the more difficulty inasmuch as 
in the United States a decline in average pro-
ductivity has already been causing great con-
cern. Various explanations of this downward 
t rend are put forward, but I suppose it is largely 
influenced by another very important change 
in the composition of capital; I am referring not 
only to the consumptive capital used for the 
increasing diversification of goods and ser-
vices, but also to the huge amount of capital 
accumulation required for the manufacture of 
arms. Whatever its importance for national de-
fence, this capital is obviously partly respon-
sible for the reduction in average productivity 
in the economy as a whole, although it is true 
that technological research in the field of na-
tional defense has appreciably influenced the 
system's productivity for the better. 
To return to the rate of consumption, it 
should be recognized that the neoclassical 
economists advocate very clear and straightfor-
ward measures to restrict it; for example, the 
Nobel Prize winner Milton Friedman has been 
saying in his articles4 that the price of petro-
leum produced in the United States must be 
unhesitatingly raised to the same level as that 
of the imported product, so as to attain two 
objectives at the same time: to reduce con-
sumption and to provide enterprises with the 
financial means necessary for the development 
of new sources of energy. 
Let us look at the significance of this idea, 
which of course captivates the transnational oil 
corporations. It implies an immense regressive 
redistribution of income. If existing controls 
are abolished the United States labour force 
will have to pay the increase in the price not 
only of imported but also of domestically-pro-
duced petroleum. But why should the excep-
tional profits accruing from this latter go to 
^Published in Newsweek. 
swell the concentration of wealth in the upper 
strata of the social structure? 
Clearly, prices must be raised in order to 
restrict consumption and encourage the devel-
opment of other forms of energy. Clearly too, 
there is an inescapable need to substitute the 
development of other forms of energy for im-
ports of petroleum and to cut down extravagant 
consumption. What is not so clear is that in 
order to achieve the necessary capital accumu-
lation the consumption of the bulk of the popu-
lation must be squeezed so that more and more 
capital can be accumulated by the upper strata. 
Will recourse be had to the same procedure in 
order to make the heavy investment required 
for the conservation of the environment? 
The labour force is unwilling to accept 
this. It has acquired trade-union and political 
power which enables it to recoup itself for the 
rise in prices by means of wage increases. But 
we know all too well that this is no way to 
resolve the problem. The outcome is an in-
flationary spiral, or rather the intensification of 
the spiral already existent in the system. 
In reality, the mechanisms for distributing 
the fruits of technical progress and capital ac-
cumulation have become obsolete. They fitted 
in very well with the hegemonic power of the 
centres over the periphery and in particular 
over the petroleum-producing countries, 
which have now gained considerable power of 
their own. And they were likewise consonant 
with the internal hegemonic power of those in 
whose hands most of the means of production 
are concentrated and of those who are closely 
l inked with them in the upper strata. But this 
power is increasingly counterpoised by the 
trade-union and political power of the labour 
force. And given the mechanisms in question, 
the system's only loophole is the inflationary 
spiral: a spiral that eludes the canons of fiscal 
and monetary orthodoxy. 
Such is the crisis of capitalism, above all in 
the main dynamic centre. A crisis that will ag-
gravate the enormous difficulties that were al-
ready besetting peripheral capitalism long be-
fore the upswing in petroleum prices. 
Let us not forget, however, that capitalism 
is not that tired-out horse of Nikita Krushev's 
excited imagination. It has plenty of drive, and 
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considerable creative force stimulated by con-
tinual technological innovations, partly origi-
nating in research undertaken for spatial and 
military purposes. What is more, there are in-
novations that have hardly begun to be applied, 
such as the incorporation of electronics in 
production processes. The dissemination of 
these and other techniques might increase the 
growth rate of productivity and thus offset, or 
perhaps in the course of time completely over-
come, the unfavourable effects of the adjust-
ment of the system. 
This cannot happen, however, until con-
crete results are achieved in saving energy and 
evolving substitutes. Never before was so 
powerful a brake applied to capitalist devel-
opment . 
I have endeavoured to present these phe-
nomena in the setting of an overall picture, in 
very brief outline, to be sure, and I have to 
make statements of which the full significance 
cannot be understood without an explanation 
of the modus operandi of the system's ac-
cumulation and distribution mechanism. This 
is what I am now proposing to attempt: a 
somewhat risky venture, since I am using in-
struments of analysis similar to those of which I 
have been availing myself in my critique of 
peripheral capitalism. And possibly I may 
s tumble into serious error in seeking to inter-
pret these vicissitudes of developed capital-
ism from the viewpoint of the periphery, al-
though my mistakes may perhaps be less seri-
ous than those committed by certain economists 
in the centres when pronouncing on the phe-
nomena of the periphery. In reality, no light 
can be shed on the latter's difficulties without 
this effort to interpret the disquieting problems 
that have been generated in the development 
of the leading centre by the operation of its own 
dynamics. 
5. The accumulation and distribution 
mechanisms and the crisis of capitalism 
I will start with the concept of the economic 
surplus. It is that part of the fruits of technical 
progress —of successive increases in produc-
tivity— which remains in the possession of the 
owners of the means of production, in particu-
lar those in whose hands the major proportion 
of these means is concentrated in the upper 
strata of the social structure. The surplus mani-
fests itself in the profits of enterprises; albeit 
there are certain differences between the two 
concepts, they need not be considered in the 
present study. 
This is an essentially structural phenome-
non in capitalist development, of which I shall 
endeavour to give a concise explanation. De-
velopment necessitates a steady increase in ac-
cumulation of reproductive capital in order to 
provide more employment for the labour force 
—in the broadest sense of the term— while 
using productivity-raising techniques. This 
process is characterized by a sort of regressive 
competition, especially in the early phases of 
development; much of" the labour force em-
ployed has no spontaneous capacity within the 
play of market forces to secure wage increases 
correlative with the increase in productivity, 
since it is prevented from doing so by competi-
tion on the part of the manpower which is em-
ployed in preceding lower-productivity layers 
of technology or is unemployed. Only those 
members of the labour force that possess the 
ever greater skills demanded by technical 
progress (in particular the executive personnel 
of large enterprises) have this spontaneous ca-
pacity to participate in its fruits. 
In more recent phases of the capitalist de-
velopment of the centres, as changes take place 
in their social structure, three phenomena have 
supervened which strengthen the capacity of 
the labour force to share in the benefits of 
growing productivity: 
— an increase in the proportion of the la-
bour force possessing the aforesaid greater 
skills; 
— a progressive decrease in the labour 
force employed in lower-productivity layers of 
technology (process of homogenization of 
technique); 
— growth of the trade-union and political 
power of the labour force. 
Similarly, the State is tending to absorb an 
ever-increasing share of the fruits of technical 
progress in order to cover the expansion of its 
services, social, general and national defence 
alike. To provide these services the State di-
rectly employs manpower or does so indirectly 
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through inputs of goods and services which the 
labour force produces and which are not neces-
sary for the performance of its functions. And if 
all this is to run smoothly a continuous rise in 
productivity is indispensable. 
Thus the surplus is subject to two move-
ments in opposite directions. On the one hand 
it increases by virtue of the growth of produc-
tivity and, on the other hand, it decreases be-
cause a share in it is acquired by the labour 
force, thanks to its trade-union and political 
power, and because of the expansion of State 
services. 
In the dynamics of development two 
strong pressures are thus exerted on the sur-
plus: that of the labour force and that of the 
State. If the system is to function regularly, 
these two great pressures must be compatible 
with each other and with the continuous 
growth of the surplus, by virtue of successive 
increases in productivity. 
In the present advanced phase of the sys-
tem in the centres there is nothing that makes 
for this compatibility, nor was there even be-
fore expenditure on national defence had con-
tributed to inflation in the leading centre. 
There is also food for thought in the fact 
that the acquisition of trade-union and political 
power by the labour force so as to share in the 
benefits of technical progress has been intensi-
fied in recentphases of capitalist development. 
While that power was weak, or non-exis-
tent, it is understandable that the pressure of 
State services could have been exerted through 
taxation and without affecting the surplus, at 
the expense of increases in the earnings of the 
labour force or even of the level they had at-
tained. 
The political power of the upper strata was 
sufficient to defend the dynamics of the sur-
plus. Now that it is counterpoised by the trade-
union and political power of the labour force, 
the latter manages to recoup itself for the reduc-
tion in its earnings by shifting the effects of the 
tax burden on to the surplus. 
Accordingly, a highly significant change 
has taken place, linked to those that have oc-
curred in the social structure. Thus, as the sys-
tem evolves, when the aforesaid twofold pres-
sure tends to outweigh the increases in produc-
tivity, it is met in the end by constraints on the 
growth of the surplus. 
Yet the growth of the surplus is an essential 
requisite in the dynamics of the system if the 
accumulation and consumption of the upper 
strata are continually to increase. Any slack-
ening to that growth has damaging repercus-
sions on the dynamics in question. Enterprises 
then react by raising prices in order to ensure 
that the surplus goes on growing as before. And 
the rise in prices, in its turn, prompts a counter-
reaction on the part of the labour force, which 
seeks to recoup itself by wage increases. And 
thus the spiral begins. 
It may well be that the moderate inflation 
which occured in the United States before the 
State deficit acquired major proportions was 
imputable to this phenomenon. In point of fact, 
the accumulation and distribution mechanism 
is governed by no regulatory principle, nor 
does it include devices whereby a slackening 
of the growth rate of the surplus, or of course a 
decrease in the surplus itself, can be spontane-
ously offset by an increase in the accumulation 
of productive capital achieved by the labour 
force on its own account or by the State. 
The implications of the phenomena de-
scribed elsewhere can now be readily under-
stood: 
— firstly, the average rate of increase of 
productivity has been reduced, with the resul-
tant weakening of the dynamics of growth, 
mainly —as I assume— by the consumptive 
investment allocated to the diversification of 
goods and services as well as by investment in 
the manufacture of arms in the protection of the 
environment. To all of which is now added 
investment to tackle the energy crisis, with 
effects similar to the foregoing; 
— secondly, the increases in costs and 
prices of goods and services brought about by 
the rise in energy prices and the defence mea-
sures adopted in relation to the environment 
have also to be borne, in the last analysis, by the 
surplus, given the power of the labour force. 
Obviously, the outcome of all this is an 
intensification of the inflationary spiral. 
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6. The fiscal deficit and inflation 
T h e State, for understandable political reasons, 
has been unwilling to increase the tax burden 
and has had to resort to monetary expansion to 
cover the fiscal deficit. Nevertheless, even if it 
had imposed heavier taxes, the consequences 
would still have been largely inflationary. If 
the tax burden had fallen in one way or another 
on the labour force, this latter would have tried 
to recoup itself by wage increases at the ex-
pense of the surplus, as was said before, and 
this would have brought in its train a rise in 
prices. Enterprises, in their turn, would have 
defended themselves in the same way if taxes 
had been levied directly on the surplus. 
Be this as it may, inflationary financing of 
the deficit has forced up prices, and with the 
increase —albeit insufficient— in earnings the 
inflationary spiral that was already developing 
to a moderate extent has been considerably in-
tensified. And on top of all this, inflation has 
been given further impetus by the energy crisis 
and protection of the environment. 
These different pressures have been 
eased, however, inasmuch as part of the infla-
tionary expansion of demand due to the fiscal 
deficit has been met with an increase in general 
imports, that is, at the expense of the gross 
product of the rest of the world. The dimen-
sions of this situation, aggravated as it is by 
larger volumes of petroleum imports and the 
considerable rise in their value, have been ap-
preciably influenced by the regressive income 
distribution that has accompanied inflation. 
Thus, imports of those goods towards which the 
demand of the social groups favoured by infla-
tion is primarily oriented have intensively in-
creased, mainly to the detriment of the con-
sumption of the social groups with less redis-
tributive and defensive power. 
This growth of imports in excess of exports 
and other external resources has been the most 
important factor in the United States' chronic 
balance-of-payments deficit. And to this are 
superadded the transnational corporations' in-
vestments abroad, in so far as they have not 
been financed by the entreprises' own external 
profits. 
In others words, the expansion of State ex-
pendi ture has not been covered by reducing 
consumption —except for the consumption of 
the disadvantaged social groups—but has been 
superimposed upon it and upon private in-
vestment. And the consequent overflow of de-
mand in relation to the domestic product has 
spilled outwards and has been met with part of 
the product of the rest of the world, as has just 
been noted. 
7. The international propagation of inflation 
The internal inflationary pressure has been 
diverted mainly to those centres which, like the 
Federal Republic of Germany and Japan, have 
benefited by the inflationary growth of demand 
in the leading centre. These countries have 
supplied goods and received in exchange cur-
rencies which only in part have been used in 
their turn to purchase imports from the United 
States. Why has this happened? Why have 
those countries with a surplus not increased 
their purchases from the United States so as to 
cover its external deficit? 
I shall try to give a simple explanation of 
this complex phenomenon whose world impor-
tance is so great. 
The growth of exports from the countries 
favoured by the inflationary expansion of de-
mand in the United States steps up the internal 
income of the countries in question and stimu-
lates demand for goods and services. To satisfy 
this growing demand enterprises try to in-
crease their output. Accordingly, they need to 
pay out larger amounts of income to the factors 
of production in the course of the production 
process under way, and to that end resort to 
bank credit. This is inevitable, given the way 
the system works. 
Thus, to the primary expansion of income 
deriving from exports, is added this secondary 
expansion. The growth of domestic demand 
therefore tends to outstrip that of the supply of 
end goods, which naturally lags behind the 
production under way. And so to the inflationa-
ry pressure of external origin internal pressure 
is added. 
It is understandable that in these circum-
stances the monetary authorities of the exporter 
countries should determine to curb credit ex-
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pansion. In reality, they are faced with a serious 
di lemma; to maintain or accelerate, as the case 
may be, the growth rate of the economy, by 
allowing prices to rise above the limit deemed 
appropriate; or to moderate the growth rate in 
order to contain inflation. 
T h e external implications of the latter 
course are very important. This slower rate of 
growth does not allow imports to increase 
enough to catch up with the expansion of ex-
ports, or to outstrip it so that the monetary re-
serves accumulated are drawn upon. 
While this monetary policy of moderation 
does nothing to help to stabilize the United 
States' balance of payments, it does tend to 
mitigate the intensity of world inflation: it 
contains inflation in the countries with a sur-
plus and at the same time prevents it from 
be ing intensified in the United States. If an 
inordinate expansion of credit in the exporter 
countries were to increase their imports the 
dollars forming their reserves would return to 
the country whence they came —i.e., to the 
United States—, thus giving further impetus to 
inflation. 
The monetary authorities of the United 
States are also faced with the necessity of 
containing the secondary expansion of income, 
since they cannot restrict the primary expan-
sion deriving from the fiscal deficit. This latter 
would involve intervening in basic decisions 
respecting State expenditure, which only the 
political organ can adopt. So, when the infla-
tionary rise in prices oversteps certain bounds, 
the monetary authority uses its instruments to 
curb secondary expansion. It is faced with the 
same di lemma that was referred to above and 
opts for reducing the growth rate of the econ-
omy. 
In any event, the economic recession 
caused by monetary restriction, both in the 
United States and in the other centres, means 
sacrificing the increase in the product that 
could have been achieved in non-inflationary 
conditions. Thus we are faced with a paradoxi-
cal situation. In the course of the endeavour to 
slow down the growth rate of private and social 
consumption so that large sums can be ex-
pended by the State through inflationary ex-
pedients , the economic recession ultimately 
results in a reduction of the growth rate or even 
a contraction of the product. And this helps to 
aggravate the inflationary incidence of the ex-
pendi ture in question. 
8. The crisis of capitalism in the leading centre 
In the light of the foregoing observations, there 
can be no doubt that capitalism, especially in its 
principal dynamic centre, is passing through a 
serious crisis. To maintain that this crisis has 
been caused by the rise in petroleum prices is 
to overlook the fact that it had already been 
brewing before. The petroleum troubles have 
aggravated it, and the measures to conserve the 
environment have similar consequences. It is 
therefore worth while to summarize our expla-
nations even at the risk of a certain amount of 
repetition. 
Notwithstanding their great social signif-
icance, investments for the purpose of devel-
oping new sources of energy, as well as those 
required to deal with environmental problems, 
will slow down the average growth rate of pro-
ductivity and of the global product, thereby 
weakening the growth rate of the surplus. 
Moreover, the increases in costs and prices 
of goods and services attributable to the higher 
energy prices and the conservation of the envi-
ronment will tend to be transferred to enter-
prises, to the detriment of the surplus. Given 
the modus operandi of the system, the enter-
prises will try to restore the dynamics of the 
surplus by raising prices. But that does not re-
solve the problem. 
The difficulty consists in maintaining, if 
not increasing, the rate of accumulation while 
the growth rate of productivity and of the global 
product is declining. And the only way to do so 
is to restrict the rate of consumption. It is true 
that important technological innovations, such 
as electronics, for example, may give fresh im-
petus to productivity in the course of time. In so 
far as consumption is curbed within the infla-
tionary spiral, it will be at the cost of great social 
inequity. 
It must also be borne in mind that prior to 
the energy crisis the rate of productivity was 
already rising, and while this was happening 
the labour force continued to exert, if not to 
increase, its pressure for income redistribution. 
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Thus , these two factors in combination 
he lped to weaken the dynamics of the surplus 
even before the adoption of the measures re-
qui red by the biosphere. And they consequent-
ly account for the system's propensity to gener-
ate an inflationary spiral when the trade-union 
and political power of the labour force is 
s trengthened. 
It must be recognized, however, that what 
has given great momentum to the inflationary 
spiral in the United Stated has been and still is 
the fiscal deficit. The attempt to contain it by 
restricting credit for enterprises has unfavour-
able effects on the growth rate of the product, 
which aggravate the impact of investment that 
does not directly contribute to the improve-
men t of productivity. 
Such is the crisis of a system which never-
theless has enormous dynamic potential: an 
exceptional technological capacity and consid-
erable entrepreneurial drive. I am inclined to 
think that the major flaw is the accumulation 
and distribution mechanism. It is an obsolete 
mechanism; it is not in keeping with internal 
changes in the composition of power or with 
the implications of the external change that 
took place when the hegemonic power of the 
centres was countervailed, for the first time in 
capitalist development, by the power of part of 
the periphery. 
9. Reflections on the crisis 
I be l ieve that neither public opinion nor politi-
cal movements in the leading centre are fully 
aware as yet of these problems and of the major 
adjustments which are essential for the opera-
tion of the system. 
Nor has a consensus been reached among 
economists, who for the most part are still en-
gaged in interpreting development in the light 
of a simple economic theory, instead of by 
means of a global theory which embraces the 
various components of the complex reality of 
development . What is more, they delight in 
proclaiming their discrepancies rather than 
seeking areas of agreement. It is easy to under-
stand the bewilderment of Kenneth Galbraith, 
who a short time ago (in a letter to the New York 
Times dated 7 May 1979) expressed his aston-
ishment at a certain fatalistic resignation on the 
part of official United States economists in face 
of the aggravation of inflation. Why, he asked, 
do w e need economists in these circum-
stances? It could not be that his colleagues be-
lieved they were only needed to tell us that 
things were getting worse and that nothing 
could be done. Were his friends, he wondered, 
so lacking in professional pride that they did 
not realize what failure meant? 
Easy to understand, too, in face of the 
prospects of the exhaustion of petroleum and 
the deterioration of the environment, is the 
perplexity of many economists for whom the 
efficient utilization of productive resources 
through the free play of market laws was an 
inviolable article of faith. 
Nor should it be a matter for surprise that 
public opinion did not from the very outset of 
the petroleum crisis support the adoption of 
efficacious measures to deal with it.5 The phys-
ical volume of the United States' imports of 
petroleum rose by 31% between 1973 and 
1978. It is doubtless very difficult for so power-
ful a country to recognize the emergence of the 
power of the petroleum-exporting countries. 
For this reason it was insistently predicted that 
the so-called producer's cartel could not sur-
vive. 
From time to time, however, a sensible 
observation comes to light. I remember that a 
few months ago a Washington Post columnist 
compared OPEC's decision to restrict the 
growth of production in order to support price 
increases with the United States Government's 
decision to control production of grain, with a 
view to attaining a similar objective at the in-
ternational level. Except that the attitude of the 
petroleum producers was dictated by the long-
cherished aim of stopping the continued 
squandering of a non-renewable energy re-
source. Furthermore, despite low prices, the 
transnational corporations made huge profits, 
because of the great expansion of production, 
and thus were comfortably able to finance their 
national and international investment, to a 
5At the time of writing President Carter is making a 
dramatic appeal to public opinion in his country to face up 
to the energy crisis. 
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large extent irrespectively of the development 
of the producer countries. 
Nor have enlightened voices failed to 
make themselves heard on the OPEC side; 
ever since 1973 they have manifested deep 
concern for the want of effective measures to 
contain the expansion of consumption in the 
major centres. 
In face of these facts the possibility of an 
agreement between OPEC and the great con-
sumer countries remains an illusion, especially 
w h e n political factors come into play which 
complicate the problem. In this way the inter-
nal spiral has spread to the international field. 
United States inflation had already been depre-
ciating real petroleum prices long before 1973, 
and the rise in prices in that year acted as a 
further spur to inflation, so that the real price of 
oil once again deteriorated, while at the same 
t ime the real value of the dollar currency re-
serves of the producer countries decreased. It 
is understandable, then, that the exporter coun-
tries should have again raised prices. Accord-
ingly, the international spiral is closely linked 
to the internal spiral. 
But the inflationary spiral is not a solution 
ei ther in the international or in the internal 
field. Let us now revert to this latter. 
As noted before, it would be impossible to 
eliminate the inflationary spiral —whatever its 
origin— without restricting consumption itself 
or its rate of growth. Apart from the technical 
means of doing so, the political problem thus 
posed is extremely serious. What will be the 
impact of this adjustment on the various social 
strata? How will it affect capital accumulation? 
Hence arises a question whose signifi-
cance is self-evident. Will such restraints on 
consumption be acceptable to the labour force 
whi le the owners of the means of production 
continue increasing capital accumulation and 
consequently the concentration of wealth in 
their hands? 
Are other methods of accumulation con-
ceivable which would allow the dynamics of 
the system to be combined with equity? What-
ever idea of them may be formed, they would 
imply a highly important change in the accu-
mulation and distribution mechanism, which is 
still deeply rooted in the social structure de-
spite the great changes which this has under-
gone. The political obstacles are formidable; 
suffice it to recall here that the large enter-
prises, especially those which hold a key posi-
tion in the economy, are accustomed to pro-
claim in round terms the necessity of raising 
prices in order to increase their own capital 
accumulation. Any other idea of accumulation, 
whether State or social, is far from their minds. 
Have we not recently seen the oij companies 
vehemently protesting against President 
Carter's proposal to tap, through taxation, part 
of the extra profits they have raked in by raising 
consumer prices? 
It must be recognized that hitherto all that 
has been done is to drift along in face of this 
crisis of capitalism; it is a very different crisis 
from the great depression of the 1930s, but in 
my opinion much more serious because of the 
formidable obstacles of every kind that stand in 
the way of its resolution. 
What have the major centres done in con-
sideration of the severe warnings of the Club of 
Rome? There can be no doubt that despite its 
defects and exaggerations, especially in its 
early days, the Club put forward a genuine 
problem, which the energy crisis is now posing 
in dramatic terms. It has the great merit of 
having set afoot a most timely controversy. 
But there is not much that can be cited as a 
response on the part of the centres. Their most 
notable object of concern has been the popula-
tion explosion, particularly in the developing 
countries. How should this not be so, in view of 
its probable adverse effects on natural resour-
ces, non-renewable and renewable alike? It is 
true that at present most of these resources are 
consumed in the centres. But what would hap-
pen if the development of the periphery led it 
to take an increasing part in their use? I do not 
say that antagonism to an attitude like this, pri-
marily dictated by the interests of the centres, 
can account for the regrettable unwillingness 
of much of the periphery, especially Latin 
America, to adopt measures to reduce the birth 
rate. There have been other opposing factors. 
But I do think that the centres have failed to 
propose demographic measures in the context 
of a broad international co-operation policy; 
rather have they advocated the measures in 
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question in order to avoid such a policy. It is 
worth recording that a certain eminent United 
States politician, desirous of shirking this re-
sponsibility, did not omit to point out that one 
dollar spent on birth control was equivalent to a 
contribution of a thousand dollars in the shape 
of international funds! 
Furthermore, until not long ago there was 
strong opposition to the idea that international 
credit institutions should issue loans to devel-
oping countries to enable them to exploit their 
own natural resources. How should they in-
vade the field reserved par excellence for the 
transnational corporations? 
There was once a hope that a new policy 
might be formulated when the then Secretary 
of State, Henry Kissinger, presented at 
UNCTAD IV in Nairobi (5-31 May 1976) an 
outl ine sketch of a plan for the creation of a 
natural resources bank. Nothing came of this 
proposal, submitted at the last moment and 
without much preparation, precisely when the 
programme for the stabilization of primary 
commodities was under discussion. At all 
events , Dr. Kissinger later stated, at a meeting 
of business men in New York, that his aim was 
to obtain natural resources at low prices. This 
happened after the petroleum crisis had begun, 
that is, when the disastrous consequences of 
having squandered a non-renewable natural 
resource were already making themselves felt. 
Such an episode, especially as a man of Kis-
singer's stature was involved, once again bears 
witness to the shortsightedness of the great 
centres in face of the serious problems of pe-
ripheral development. And, what is more, the 
lack of insight —or if the reader prefers, of 
foresight— shown with respect to basic prob-
lems of the centres themselves. 
Must the crisis of capitalism in the centres, 
with all its serious repercussions on the pe-
riphery, become yet more acute before it can 
evoke a new breadth of outlook and the way can 
be cleared for major adjustments in the system? 
10. The development of the periphery 
and the problems of the biosphere 
T h e gravity of the petroleum crisis is dispelling 
in the centres, especially in the leading centre, 
a stubborn illusion: the illusion that supported 
by their hegemonic power, and availing them-
selves of their technical and financial superio-
rity, they could go on indefinitely exploiting at 
low prices the natural resources of the peri-
phery. 
Now a clearer insight into all this is being 
gained, as we said at the beginning of the pre-
sent article. The case of petroleum is extremely 
revealing; its irrational exploitation has de-
prived the exporter countries of abundant fi-
nancial resources which they could have used 
for the purposes of their own development, in 
order to free themselves in time from their de-
pendence on a resource that would not be re-
newable. But in the end the centres themselves 
have also suffered, as explained above. The 
immediate advantages of a long-mismanaged 
energy resource introduced into the capitalist 
development of the centres a substantial ele-
ment of falsity: falsity in the orientation of 
techniques; falsity in the prodigious growth of 
productivity at the expense of the biosphere. 
All this has aggravated what was already 
happening in the development process of the 
centres. It will be very difficult, although by no 
means impossible, to overcome the crisis, and 
to do so a more or less lengthy period of transi-
tion will be required; in the meantime the con-
sequences of the crisis will bear very hard on 
the periphery. 
With all their inherent evils, crises usually 
have as a rule one virtue: the virtue of teaching 
certain lessons. Perhaps these lessons may also 
help to dispel other illusions: the illusion in the 
periphery —and I will confine myself to the 
Latin American region of the periphery— that 
capitalism could develop there in the image 
and likeness of that of the centres, reproducing 
their model; and, similarly, the illusion in the 
centres that under the banner of their hegemo-
ny they could continue to forge increasingly 
close links with an imitative development 
based on flagrant social inequity and subject to 
new as well as outdated relations of depend-
ence. 
T h e centres have believed in the expan-
sionist power of their capitalism, in its capacity 
to extend the advantages of technique through-
out the world. But behind some of these beliefs 
lurk major interests which generally look no 
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farther than the immediate present. These im-
mediate interests have led them to urge their 
transnational corporations to overrun the peri-
phery and there promote and exalt the privil-
eged-consumer society, sowing with enthu-
siasm and reaping in abundance. They have 
proclaimed the excellences of the "American 
way of life" to a periphery avid for such allure-
ments. 
It is true, however, that the privileged-
consumer society could not have come into 
be ing without a social structure which, by fa-
vouring distributive inequity, sets a socially 
exclusive and conflietive stamp on develop-
ment. Now the centres are surprised at these 
obstinate features ofthe imitative capitalism of 
the periphery, in favour of which they have 
played all their cards, doing so, moreover, with 
great inconsistency. 
For in the periphery, at is pursues its de-
sign of developing in the image and likeness of 
the centres, the same problems have arisen that 
the biosphere is posing in the centres them-
selves. Obviously, imitation ofthe centres' con-
sumption patterns was bound to involve the 
irresponsible use of natural resources, al-
though in a much lesser degree. Similarly, the 
increasing urban concentration gives rise to 
very marked pollution phenomena comparable 
to those occurring in the great centres. 
This state of affairs is very seriously com-
plicating the increasingly sharp contradictions 
which imitative capitalism was already dis-
playing, and to which are now added the ad-
verse effects ofthe crisis in the centres. Let us 
now attempt an explanation. 
First and foremost comes the incidence of 
the energy problem and ofthe conservation of 
the environment on capital accumulation. Just 
as in the centres, the composition of capital will 
need to be altered; but if this change is brought 
about without raising the rate of accumulation, 
in the periphery too the growth rate of produc-
tivity and the global product will decline, with 
very serious economic and social —as well as 
political— consequences. 
In other words, it will become indispens-
able to restrict consumption so that much more 
reproductive capital can be accumulated. But 
what consumption will have to be restricted? 
What will be the impact of this process on the 
different social strata? 
Of course there has long been great need to 
step up capital accumulation in the periphery; 
in default of this, the broad masses that have 
been persistently excluded from the advan-
tages of development could not be socially in-
tegrated, nor could other flaws in the system be 
corrected. But, as I have been arguing in my 
writings, this social integration is incompatible 
with the development of the privileged-con-
sumer society and its linkages with the transna-
tional corporations. It is incompatible, because 
much ofthe capital accumulation potential that 
the increase in productivity has brought in its 
train is frittered away in imitation of the con-
sumption patterns ofthe centres. And some of it 
is also lost through the siphoning-off of income 
by the centres, in which the transnational cor-
porations play an active part. (I do not say that 
they are not useful in certain fields; but in any 
action taken a highly selective criterion must 
be applied and new rules of the game must be 
observed.) 
I do not hesitate to note in passing that in 
the Latin American region of the periphery 
these issues cannot be effectively tackled 
without establishing the social use of the sur-
plus. This not only depends on fundamental 
changes in the structure of power but also ne-
cessitates a clear perception of the aims pur-
sued and ofthe way to attain them through this 
transformation ofthe system. 
Apart from the aggravation of the accumu-
lation problem to which we have just alluded, 
the periphery's long-standing tendency to-
wards an external bottleneck, to which the rise 
in petroleum prices has given exceptional im-
petus, will also become still more marked. 
The terms in which this last question is 
posed are a matter of common knowledge. The 
tendency referred to is one inherent in devel-
opment, given the great structural differences 
be tween the periphery and the centres; the 
latter, unfortunately, have done nothing of any 
significance to enable the periphery vigorously 
to expand its industrial as well as its primary 
exports to their markets. What is more, when in 
the case of certain goods such exports have 
really begun to gain ground, it has not been 
BIOSPHERE AND DEVELOPMENT / Raúl Prebisch 83 
long before various restrictions have super-
vened. 
This is why I alluded to the inconsistency 
of the centres. They encourage and take advan-
tage of the privileged-consumer society, and 
yet place external obstacles in the way of the 
expansion of its exports and the payment of its 
financial remittances. 
The effects of the crisis in the centres on 
the tendency towards a bottleneck are already 
making themselves felt. There are two impor-
tant aspects to consider: firstly, the decrease in 
the growth rate of the centres; and secondly, 
the deterioration of the terms of trade. Let us 
pause a moment to look at the latter, since the 
former calls for no comment. 
The explanation of the deterioration of the 
terms of trade lies in the rise in prices not only 
of imports of petroleum and petroleum prod-
ucts, but also, as a result of inflation, of goods 
imported from the centres. 
Here again influence is exerted by those 
structural differences which account for the 
characteristic disparity between demand for 
the goods exported by the periphery and de-
mand for those exported by the centres; gener-
ally speaking, the former tends to grow faster 
than the latter. Thus it is difficult for the periph-
ery to transfer the increase in its production 
costs as the centres do in the case of the goods 
they export; even more so, when to this in-
crease is added the rise in internal costs caused 
by measures for the protection of the environ-
ment. If, for example, the high income-elastici-
ty of world demand for the goods exported by 
the Federal Republic of Germany is compared 
with the feeble elasticity of demand for the 
manufactures exported by Latin America, the 
nature of this problem will be better under-
stood. 
Apart from this, the impact of these facts on 
agricultural production and exports is usually 
severe, for not only do petroleum prices rise, 
bu t also those of fertilizers and pesticides of 
petrochemical origin. 
Moreover, agricultural commodities de-
serve separate comment. In the article by Os-
valdo Sunkel which appears in this same issue, 
mention is made of the depletion of soils by bad 
agricultural practices and deforestation; and 
this situation is noted as common in the periph-
ery. Exports of certain agricultural commodi-
ties contain that part of natural wealth which is 
lost through poor agricultural practices, with-
out its figuring in production costs. And in this 
way imports partly destined for the privileged-
consumer society are paid for, as Sunkel 
shrewdly remarks. It is true that sooner or later 
it will become unavoidably necessary to recov-
er the fertility lost by using those petrochemi-
cal fertilizers whose prices have risen, among 
other measures. Here we come upon an addi-
tional problem, owing to the aforesaid weak 
capacity of the periphery to transfer its higher 
production costs at the international level. 
There is yet another aspect of the question 
to which attention should be drawn. I refer to 
demand for the agricultural products of temper-
ate zones, which, with its typical fluctuations, 
has followed a persistent upward trend, al-
though increasing more slowly than demand 
for manufactured goods. This growth of de-
mand has led to the substitution of petroleum 
for animal traction and of petrochemical for nat-
ural fertilizers, the latter proceeding having 
helped to improve yields per hectare. So the 
rising trend of demand does not suffice to ab-
sorb the production increment without a fall in 
prices. And this factor has militated against the 
expansion of production, thus exercising a 
moderating influence on the deterioration of 
the terms of trade. 
Here again the centres have demonstrated 
their superior capacity for adjustment in com-
parison with the periphery, since in order to 
prevent prices from falling and even to improve 
them, they have restricted production or im-
ports of agricultural commodities. Whereas the 
peripheral countries have attempted to coun-
teract their weakness by means of commodity 
agreements, which generally arouse strong op-
position in the centres, owing to their appre-
hension lest prices should increase. 
To sum up, we are not witnessing new 
problems but old ones that have grown formi-
dable; they have long been looming up, and the 
centres have been reluctant to adopt measures 
to assist the periphery in resolving them. If 
they were not willing to do so during the long 
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years of prosperity that preceded the rise in 
petroleum prices, can a change of attitude be 
expected while their crises last? 
In point of fact the centres, carried away by 
their immediate interest, have not yet grasped 
the full significance of the adverse effects of 
technique on the periphery, as distinct from its 
contribution to welfare; but they will not be 
able to escape the economic, political and strat-
egical consequences of those effects, now 
much more serious than before. As I recently 
remarked at the fifth session of UNCTAD, held 
in Manila: "The centres cannot have recourse 
to a cordon, sanitaire to isolate them from un-
favourable events in the periphery. For the first 
t ime they are talking of interdependence. In-
terdependence between unequal parties, of 
course, but at all events any adverse effects on 
the periphery resulting from inaction on the 
part of the centres will redound sooner or later 
to the detriment of the centres themselves. 
Such is the complexity of the world today. 
"Our developing countries too will have to 
accept the fact that there are no cordons sani-
taires to isolate the groups that have benefited 
by development from those that have been left 
behind. There are none; and to recognize these 
truths is the most elementary expression of that 
foresight which is the hallmark of enlightened 
statesmen." 
